For a long time, migration has been subject to intensive economic research. Nevertheless, empirical evidence regarding the determinants of migration still appears to be incomplete. In this paper, we analyze the effects of socio-economic and institutional determinants, especially labor-market institutions, on migrants' choices. Based on a large data set constructed from micro-data for France, Germany, the UK and the US, we study their decisions to migrate to one of the four countries using a Multinomial Choice framework. Our estimates confirm a number of conventional results such as positive effects of wages and immigrant networks and negative effects of unemployment rates. In addition, we find that employment protection, union coverage and unemployment benefits have positive effects on migration. Also good education and health systems tend to attract migrants, while generous pension systems may deter them. Based on separate estimations for high-and low-skilled migrants, there is evidence that the effects of labor-market institutions differ across skill groups.
Introduction
Moving to another country often implies fundamental changes for the life of migrants.
They have to build up a new social network and get accustomed to a new institutional framework. Usually, migration is not the result of a spontaneous decision, but the outcome of a long decision process. Therefore, the institutions of possible destination countries should at least play some role in this process. For instance, if public regulation impedes labor-market entry for "outsiders", migrant workers should ceteris paribus prefer destination countries with more flexible labor markets. Similarly, older persons should prefer countries that give them access to a better health-care system, and parents should prefer countries that offer their children better education. The aim of our paper is to analyze whether these and other institutions play a role for the migration decision and to quantify their effects.
How migrants choose their destination country is an interesting research question per se. In addition, the answer to this question has important implications for migration policy. On the one hand, it can help to estimate migration potentials for the case of unrestricted mobility which, in turn, may have a strong influence on the final decision about immigration policy if a country is considering some modifications. On the other hand, it can have an influence on the assessment of migration regulations already in place. A prominent example for this is the large inflow of Polish people to the UK after the EU enlargement in 2004. It is argued that a large part of these people would have come to Germany, if Germany had also opened its labor market immediately (Baas and Brücker 2007) . However, in the relevant years unemployment in the UK was much lower than in Germany. Thus, one could also argue that these people would have gone to the UK anyway because of their better labor-market prospects there. Last but not least, knowledge about the determinants of migration decisions can help policy makers to design effective programs to attract specific groups of foreigners (such as the British "Highly Skilled Migrant Programme" the H1B visa in the US, or the German "Green Card" for IT specialists).
Over the last few years, a series of papers have emerged that analyze the determi-1 nants of migrants' location choices (e.g., Pedersen et al. 2008; Mayda 2007 ; Docquier the determinants of their choice of a destination country. In contrast to our approach, however, they only use individual characteristics and no general features of the destination countries as explanatory variables. There is a number of papers using a similar approach to determine the regional distribution of immigrants within their destination countries (Åslund 2005; Bartel 1989 ; Jaeger 2000; and Bauer et al. 2005; 2007) . Since political and economic institutions do not vary very much across regions of one country, whereas they differ substantially across countries, the results are only partially comparable with ours.
To date, the impact of institutions on migration decisions has hardly been studied in a systematic way. 6 Thus, our results offer interesting and important new insights regarding the determinants of migration decisions. Our more conventional findings are that wages and migrant networks have a positive effect on the probability to migrate to a particular country, while the unemployment rate has a negative effect. The income tax wedge negatively affects migration, and the same applies to generous pension benefits, while good education systems and good health-care systems appear to have a positive impact.
In addition, we find that the labor-market institutions which we consider -employment protection, union coverage and unemployment benefits -all have positive effects on the migration decision. Running separate estimations for qualified and low-skilled migrants, we find for most institutions the same effects. However, union coverage and unemployment benefits now negatively affect the migration choice for qualified migrants, while the positive effects are again there for low-skilled migrants. Also, the positive effect of employment protection remains for both groups.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain how our data set is constructed. In section 3, we present a number of descriptive results regarding immigration to the four countries of our analysis. Section 4 deals with determinants of migration and, in particular, with institutions that may have an influence on migration decisions. In section 5, we discuss our estimation strategy, and in section 6, we present our results based on the full sample and on separate estimations for qualified and low-skilled migrants. Section 7 concludes.
The data set
Our data set combines micro-data from large official surveys of the British, French, German and US population. An important preliminary step is to find a proper definition of migrants. Immigrants could be defined as persons holding one or more foreign nationalities. Yet, this approach is problematic as naturalization policies of the four countries differ substantially. For instance, the German naturalization policy is much more restrictive than the American one. Hence, looking at individuals with foreign nationalities could lead to biased results.
Defining immigrants by their country of birth circumvents this problems. However, since foreign-born children whose parents are both natives are then classified as immigrants, this definition can also lead to problems, e.g., if a non-marginal part of the foreign-born population are children of armed forces positioned abroad. Therefore, we choose the following approach: we define immigrants as foreign-born people, but re-classify persons with two native parents as natives. 7 The effect of this re-classification on the overall 7 For the UK, respectively, we re-classify persons who state to be "ethnically British".
number of immigrants is small, but their composition changes notably (see Geis et al.
for more details).
In the case of Germany, we have to deal with two specific issues. First, in the German data the country of birth of immigrants is not recorded. We therefore use the nationality, respectively the nationality before naturalization, as a proxy for the country of birth. The second issue is related to the "(Spät-)Aussiedler " legislation. According to this legislation, persons with German ancestors (who sometimes emigrated centuries ago, mainly to countries in Eastern Europe) can acquire the German nationality immediately upon arrival in Germany. After the fall of the "Iron Curtain", a large number of "Spät-Aussiedler " came to Germany (Koller 1997 ). Yet, in spite of their quantitative importance, official statistics in Germany hardly collect any data on this group. In our data set, we are able to identify them as immigrants, 8 but we cannot assign them a country of birth.
For the source countries, or countries of birth, we choose the following classification:
EU countries, non-EU Europe (including Russia and Turkey), West Asia (from Lebanon to Iran), East Asia and Oceania, Africa, Latin America, Canada 9 and "unclassified" 10 . A more detailed differentiation is not possible, due to existing classifications in the German and French data sources. For the econometric analysis, people who migrate between our four destination countries also have to be excluded, 11 but the descriptive results reported in the next section cover these migrants as well.
As a further step, we have to standardize a number of other variables we are using.
The only institution for which the standardization is not trivial is education. Here, we classify educational attainments of our observations using the International Standard 8 Alternative explanations for why Germans with German parents should have "migrated" to Germany are highly unlikely. For instance, since World War II Germany had hardly any armed forces positioned abroad. Also, all persons with German nationality who came to Germany before 1949, mostly as refugees from former parts of the country, are automatically defined as natives. 9 In the case of Germany, Canadians are excluded, as we cannot distinguish them from US Americans. 10 By far the largest part of them being German "Aussiedler ". 11 The reason is that, with respect to migration between the four countries, we can only observe potential outcomes of migration to three destination countries. Decisions to stay in the home country or to migrate there, though vastly different, cannot be told apart. In the last step, we merge the standardized variables from the four national data sets to form one large data base, using the weights from the original data sources. As these weights make the data sets representative for the different countries, our data base should also be representative. 
Some descriptive results
Before turning to the econometric analysis, we present some descriptive statistics from our data. These statistics do not only serve as background information for our estimation results, they are also interesting in themselves. Applying a consistent definition of migrants, our data give a very precise picture of the migrant population in the four countries.
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Comparing the shares of immigrants in the population aged 15 and older in the four countries already leads to a surprising result (cf. There are not only differences regarding the countries of origin of immigrants, but also regarding their structure in terms of educational attainments. the US. They also show that economic integration differs across skill groups. When analyzing the determinants of migration, it is thus less appropriate to rely on countrywide averages. Specific information, i.e. information differentiated with respect to skill groups for example, is of value, which we are able to use in the following due to the micro-structure of our data.
Determinants of migration
In the economic migration literature, wages and unemployment rates are generally consid- However, obtaining consistent data on wages is very difficult in general and still far from easy even with our micro-data, since the wage data provided in our data sets are not comparable across countries. To generate wage information from our four national data sources which are as consistent as possible, we proceed as follows: In a first step, we calculate wages per hour using information on wage earnings and working hours contained in all datasets. As our German dataset actually contains income and not wage data, we consider only persons stating to have no income other than wages for this. 15 In a next step, we calculate wages of immigrants for the various gender-education groups relative to the respective average wages in each country. In the last step, we multiply these relative wages of immigrants with data on GDP per capita (from OECD 2007a). We cannot directly This need not be a problem, however, as smaller groups are probably lacking the critical mass to deliver the benefits of a network. As the effect of the size of the network on migration decisions may not be linear -in smaller networks, additional persons are probably more important than in larger ones -we also include the square of this measure.
In addition, immigration policy and the openness of a country for immigrants may also influence the migration decision. However, immigration policy is difficult to measure -immigration laws are usually complex and rather case-specific -and there does not exist a consistent indicator of immigration policy, or openness, for all our four destination countries. 16 Thus, we cannot observe this determinant directly. Yet, as one should assume that in the long run a more open country attracts more immigrants, we use the total share of foreign-born persons in a country as a rough measure for its openness to migrants.
Beside the factors discussed so far, there is a host of other potential determinants of migrants' location choices. 17 For instance, unemployment benefits should also have an influence on migration decisions, since expected income in the destination country is basically given by the employment rate times wages plus the unemployment rate times these benefits. However, quantifying unemployment benefits is complicated as benefit entitlements often depend on the time a person has been (un-)employed. For our set-up, the most convincing measure that is available are average replacement rates for the first five years of unemployment as provided by the OECD (2004). 18 The role of unemployment benefits may also depend on the unemployment rate in a given country. If unemployment is low, migrants expect to find work, and benefits have next to no influence on the decision for this country. However, if unemployment is high, migrants expect to become unemployed with some probability, and benefits really matter for their potential income.
To control for this effect, we interact the replacement rate with the unemployment rate.
Other factors which affect expected income in the destination country are income taxes and social-security contributions. As we are unable to fully capture the different schemes by which these levies redistribute income from highly productive to less productive individuals we use total tax wedges (including social-security contributions), differentiated for average high-and low-income workers without children and for average workers with When considering to migrate, people may not only look at their labor-market prospects but also at institutions in other areas. One important factor may be the health-care system in potential destination countries. We effectively use infant mortality (OECD 2007b) as a measure for the quality of health-care systems. For young families (and persons who think about having children), the education system in the destination country may also play a role. We thus include PISA science scores (OECD 2006a) as a measure for the quality of the education system. At the same time, people who do not (plan to) have children may not prefer high-quality public education as this requires higher taxes. The education system of a destination country can also affect the choice of potential immigrants for other reasons. Countries with a high share of high-skilled individuals are potentially more innovative than others and therefore likely to generate higher growth. We therefore include the share of people with a tertiary degree (ISCED 5+6) from our micro-data as a measure for the skill structure.
Last but not least, a generous old-age pension system could also have a positive impact on the location choice; but since migrants first have to pay a correspondingly higher amount of contributions, the effect can also be negative. 19 In any case, we use pension replacement rates differentiated by wage brackets (OECD 2007c) to control for this aspect.
There are certainly many more institutions that may also play a role for the decision to migrate to a particular country. We believe, however, that the institutions described here (see also table 3) are the most important ones.
Estimation strategy
For the estimation, we use a combination of a Conditional and a Multinomial Logit
Model (CMNL). 20 The basic idea of the model is that among a range J of options -in our case, among destination countries, individuals choose the one that offers them the highest utility, V ij ; here, i denotes the individual and j the option. This utility, in turn, depends on option-dependent explanatory variables, X ij , and on option-invariant ones, Z i . Assuming a linear relation and adding an error term, utility levels are represented by the following equation:
The observed variable y ij indicates which option an individual has chosen. Thus, for k ∈ J , y ik = 1 and
Furthermore, it is assumed that the error terms, ij , are independent and log-Weibull-distributed; the density of this function is e
. It can be shown that the probability function has the following form (see Amemiya 1981 ):
For the estimation, this CMNL has to be transformed into a pure Conditional Logit
Model. Following Cameron and Trivedi (2005), we use the following probability function for the estimation:
where Z * is the Kronecker product of Z and a J × J identity matrix I, Z * = Z ⊗ I, and γ * = [0 , γ 2 , . . . , γ J ]; γ 1 = 0 is a normalization. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. The resulting first-order condition is given by:
The marginal effects of changes in the option-dependent explanatory variables can be calculated as follows (cf. Cameron and Trivedi 2005):
The equation gives the effect of a change in the independent variable for option k on the probability that option j is chosen; δ ijk is equal to 1 if j = k and 0 otherwise. Elasticities are given by:
It can be shown that the resulting estimates are consistent, asymptotically normal and asymptotically efficient. A characteristic of the Conditional Logit Model which is often criticized is the independence of irrelevant alternatives. In our case, this is actually an advantage, as we can only observe a limited number of countries. Our results would be of very limited relevance if the possibility to go to Spain had an effect on choices between
Germany and the US.
The low variation in our institutional variables -many of them are country-specific -clearly presents a challenge. On the one hand, considering all of them in a single regression is not possible, as this would lead to multi-collinearity. On the other hand, more detailed information is not available, and adding more destination countries to our data set is all but easy. Therefore, we choose to expand the number of estimations using different combinations of the various institutions captured by our data. The following individual-specific variables are included in all regressions: level of education, gender, age (and age squared), (squared) years since migration and region of the country of birth.
Furthermore, all regressions contain information on wages, unemployment rates and the (squared) size of migrant networks, as these are variables which are conventionally found to have a strong impact on migrants' location decisions.
In a first step, the institutional variables are then included one by one in the re- do the same to explain civil wars). We use the extreme-bound criterion proposed by Leamer (1985) to test the significance of our estimates. 21 
Estimation results
The results of regressions in which we control for wages, unemployment rates, networks where we control for one, two or three institutional variables in addition to wages, unemployment rates and networks (squared). Except for the share of high skilled, the median 21 Lower (upper) extreme bounds are given by minimum (maximum) estimates minus (plus) two times the corresponding standard deviation. We also tried to apply the criterion proposed by Sala-i-Martin (1997). However, in our case -with low standard errors of the estimates, but relatively high variation over specifications -this criterion is inappropriate, as it attaches no weight to the variation of coefficients over specifications. however, when the network is already large, an increase in its size has hardly an additional positive effect. We also find that open countries, i.e., those with a high share of foreign-born people, are indeed more attractive for immigrants than countries with a low share.
Other results are less clear a priori, hence potentially more interesting. Employment protection, union coverage and unemployment benefits have positive effects, indicating that migrants prefer destination countries where they are protected from labor-market risks. It also implies that the immigrants in our data set did not expect to become outsiders in the labor market of their destination country. Otherwise, these measures should be detrimental for immigrants as they hamper access to the labor market. At the same time, the negative coefficients for the interaction terms of employment protection and union coverage with the unemployment rate indicate that if unemployment becomes large, insider-outsider effects may become an issue.
We also find a negative effect of the income tax wedge on migration decisions, although higher taxes are potentially connected with better public services. The negative effect of pension replacement rates can be explained by the fact that more generous pension systems usually involve higher contributions and, hence, create a higher "implicit tax" than less ambitious schemes. Also, they may be subject to higher political risks in countries with low fertility rates. Good health-care systems and good education systems involve higher taxes as well which have to be paid also by healthy or childless immigrants.
Nevertheless, the quality of both systems has a positive effect on migration decisions.
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The negative effect of the share of high-skilled people in the destination country is a bit puzzling. However, a potential explanation is that quite a number of migrants are high-skilled themselves and have to compete against these "incumbents". We will discuss this in more detail below , based on additional estimations that are differentiated by skill levels of migrants. There, we also obtain more differentiated results regarding the effects of labor-market institutions.
To reduce the potential selection of our sample through re-migration, we repeat our estimations for the sub-group of individuals who migrated after 1995, i.e., within a maximum period of 10 years. The results are shown in table 6 . 24 By and large, the estimates confirm our earlier results, but three coefficients change their sign. We now find a positive effect of the pension replacement rate, while the estimates for union coverage and unemployment benefits become negative. The latter may indicate that insider-outsider problems arising from labor-market institutions are indeed relevant for newly arriving migrants.
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To assess the quantitative importance of our estimates, we calculate a matrix of elasticities for the socio-economic and institutional variables that is presented in table 7.
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Among other things, we find that a 1% increase in the unemployment rate in the US decreases the probability to migrate to the US by 0.13%, while it increases the one to go to Germany by 0.07%, to the UK by 0.02% and to France by 0.04% (thus exactly absorbing the change in Prob(US)). A 1% increase in the unemployment rate in France decreases 23 Higher quality of the health-care system is reflected in a decrease in infant mortality. 24 In another series of alternative estimates, we also applied a different weighting scheme for individual observations, hypothetically normalizing the population in each of our destination countries to 50 million. The idea was to avoid any biases that might arise from huge differences in terms of population size. However, the results were basically unchanged. 25 Alternatively, there could be both time effects and cohort effects affecting the results with respect to more recent immigration. 26 Note that these elasticities do not reflect indirect effects of changes in institutions. For instance, an increase in unemployment benefits is often linked to a decrease in (net) wages. Our elasticities show how large the effects of institutions are in ceteris-paribus terms and give us an idea of the importance of these institutions for the choice of a destination country. the probability to go to France by 0.83% (the large difference between the US and France being due to the fact that a 1% increase equals a total change by 0.07 percentage points in the US, but by 0.19 percentage points in France). Also, the ex-ante probability to go to the US is higher than the probability to go to France. The elasticities with respect to wages have the same magnitude as those for unemployment rates, but with opposite signs.
Most of the elasticities regarding the institutional variables are even larger than those for wages and unemployment rates. Note, however, that this is partly due to the scaling and the actual range of variation of the variables. 27 In any case, they show that the role of labor-market institutions and other institutional characteristics of potential destination countries is not only statistically but also economically significant for migrants' location choices.
Determinants of location choices are very likely to differ for high-skilled and low-skilled migrants. Therefore, we further exploit out micro-data and repeat our estimates running separate regressions for low-skilled (ISCED 0-2) and qualified (ISCED 3-6) migrants.
28
Note that, in contrast to existing studies based on macro data, we already control for differences between skill levels in the analysis of the full sample. However, the estimated coefficients only represent average effects, and skill-related differences are therefore captured in option-invariant variables and in the error term. Table 8 summarizes the estimates for low-skilled and qualified migrants. Note that the estimates for qualified immigrants are in general more reliable than those for low-skilled ones: High-skilled persons are relatively free in their choice of a destination country, while low-skilled people face more restrictive immigration policies and thus a more limited choice of destinations. For wages, networks and employment protection we find positive effects for both groups, as in the full data set; for unemployment and tax wedges we find negative effects. The other estimates differ between the two groups. The estimated effects for 27 For instance, the employment protection indicator effectively ranges from 0.7 to 2.9, while the PISA scores lie between 489 and 516 points (cf. table 3).
union coverage and unemployment benefits are positive for low-skilled immigrants and negative for the qualified. This could be explained by the fact that low-skilled people usually benefit more from high unemployment benefits and collectively negotiated wages than high-skilled ones. In fact, unemployment benefits are generally associated with costs which have to be paid more than proportionally by people with higher skills. Pension replacement rates now have a positive effect for high-skilled people, while for the low skilled the effect is still negative. The observed change for the high skilled might be due to the fact that the pension replacement rates as we use them, i.e. differentiated by wage brackets, indeed capture two characteristics of pension systems: their overall generosity as well as their tax-benefit link. There is evidence that both are positively connected (see Koethenbuerger et al. 2008) ; hence, the high skilled might be better off in countries with higher pension replacement rates which are less redistributive, whereas low-skilled immigrants might prefer systems that are less generous, but possibly more redistributive.
PISA scores and the share of foreigners have the expected positive sign for high-skilled immigrants and a negative sign for the low skilled while infant mortality has the expected negative sign for the high skilled and a positive sign for low-skilled immigrants. 29 For these specific results, even public expenditure does not offer a plausible reason, as the high skilled usually pay more taxes than the low skilled. Moreover, low-skilled immigrants tend to have more children and often suffer from more health problems than the high skilled.
We consider these results as underlining the lower reliability of the estimates for the low skilled as just discussed. The share of high-skilled people shows the expected signs now.
For high-skilled immigrants who have to compete with high-skilled natives, it is negative; for low-skilled immigrants who are probably complements, it is positive.
Conclusions
The decision to migrate to a particular country is a complex process and may be affected by various factors. Economists conventionally expect wages and unemployment rates to have an impact on this decision. In this paper, we show that the institutional setting in potential destination countries also plays an important role. Effectively, our results indicate that wages and unemployment rates alone do by far not suffice to explain location choices of ("non-refugee") migrants.
In addition to the conventional effects of wages and unemployment rates, which are positive respectively negative, we find a positive, but declining, effect of the size of immigrant networks and a positive effect of the "openness" of a country in general. For employment protection, union coverage and unemployment benefits, the effects turn out to be positive as well. Thus, protection against labor-market risks is obviously important for immigrants. 30 At the same time, there are indications that insider-outsider problems related to these institutions become an issue if unemployment becomes large. In addition, a higher tax wedge has a negative effect, deterring potential migrants. We also find that PISA scores have a positive effect and infant mortality a negative effect on the migration decision, indicating that migrants value good education and health systems. Our estimate for pension benefits is negative, arguably because of the higher implicit tax rate and higher political risks associated with more generous pension schemes.
Our results regarding the effects of labor-market institutions become more differentiated if we restrict attention to migrants who arrived during the last 10 years only. Union coverage and unemployment benefits then have a negative impact, while employment protection still has a positive one. If we run separate estimations for migrants in different skill groups, the same is true with respect to migration of qualified individuals. Again, 30 An interesting issue that arises in this context is that of the risk aversion of migrants (see, e.g., Chiswick 1978; and Todaro 1980, for early contributions). Generally speaking migrants should be characterized by a low degree of risk aversion as they take on the risk of migrating. But this is no contradiction to our finding that they are seeking some protection. Also note that we neither compare their risk attitude to that of the population in the migrants' source countries nor to that of the natives of their destination countries.
this may point to negative repercussions of labor-market institutions on the migrants' labor-market prospects.
We are unable to consider all the characteristics of destination countries that are potentially important for the migration decision. For instance, we are lacking any measures for the access of migrants to housing.
31 Also, some of the proxies we are using, e.g., for education systems, health protection as well as immigration policies, have limitations resulting from the lack of consistent data. Another shortcoming of our analysis arises from the fact that, for some of the variables we include, there is actually little variation in the data. For some of the institutions we investigate, it is difficult to reconstruct all variation that exists at the individual level, while others are simply fixed at a national level,
i.e., they are the same for all migrants living in one country. Still, combining micro-data from four major destination countries we provide new insights as to whether and how institutions play a role for migration decisions. Source: National micro-data sets; authors' calculations. Bold numbers are significant by the extreme bound criterion. Source: Authors' calculations and estimations.
